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Rationality and Objectivity in Science 
or 
Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes 
Twenty-five years ago, as of this writing, Thomas S. Kuhn published The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 1 It has been an extraordinarily influential 
book. Coming at the height of the hegemony of logical empiricism- as espoused 
by such figures as R. B. Braithwaite, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Carl G. 
Hempel, and Hans Reichenbach-it posed a severe challenge to the logistic ap-
proach that they practiced. 2 It also served as an unparalleled source of inspiration 
to philosophers with a historical bent. For a quarter of a century there has been 
a deep division between the logical empiricists and those who adopt the historical 
approach, and Kuhn's book was undoubtedly a key document in the production 
and preservation of this gulf. 
At a 1983 meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Divi-
sion), Kuhn and Hempel - the most distinguished living advocates for their 
respective viewpoints - shared the platform in a symposium devoted to Hempe l's 
philosophy. 3 I had the honor to participate in this symposium. On that occasion 
Kuhn chose to address certain issues pertaining to the rationality of science that 
he and Hempel had been discussing for several years. It struck me that a bridge 
could be built between the differing views of Kuhn and Hempel ifBayes's theorem 
were invoked to explicate the concept of scientific confirmation. 4 At the time it 
seemed to me that this maneuver could remove a large part of the dispute between 
standard logical empiricism and the historical approach to philosophy of science 
on this fundamental issue. 
I still believe that we have the basis for a new consensus regarding the choice 
among scientific theories. Although such a consensus, if achieved, would not 
amount to total agreement on every problem, it would represent a major rap-
prochement on an extremely fundamental issue. The purpose of the present essay 
is to develop this approach more fully. As it turns out, the project is much more 
complex than I thought in 1983. 
I should like to express my deepest gratitude to Adolf Griinbaum and Philip Kitcher for important 
criticism and valuable suggestions with respect to an earlier version of this paper. 
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§ 1. Kuhn on Scientific Rationality 
A central part of Kuhn's challenge to the logical empiricist philosophy of 
science concerns the nature of theory choice in science. The choice between two 
fundamental theories (or paradigms), he maintains, raises issues that "cannot be 
resolved by proof." To see how they are resolved we must talk about "techniques 
of persuasion," or about "argument and counterargument in a situation in which 
there can be no proof." Such choices involve the exercise of the kind of judgment 
that cannot be rendered logically explicit and precise. Such statements, along with 
many others that are similar in spirit, led a number of critics to attribute to Kuhn 
the view that science is fundamentally irrational and lacking in objectivity. 
Kuhn was astonished by this response, which he regarded as a serious misin-
terpretation. In his "Postscript-1969," in the second edition of The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, and in "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice"5 
he replies to these charges. What he had intended to convey was the claim that 
the decision by the community of trained scientists constitutes the best criterion 
of objectivity and rationality we can have. In order better to understand the nature 
of such objective and rational methods we need to look in more detail at the con-
siderations that are actually brought to bear by scientists when they endeavor to 
make comparative evaluations of competing theories. 
For purposes of illustration, Kuhn offers a (nonexhaustive) list of characteris-
tics of good scientific theories that are, he claims: 
individually important and collectively sufficiently varied to indicate what is 
at stake. . . . These five characteristics-accuracy, consistency, scope, sim-
plicity, and fruitfulness-are all standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy 
of a theory. . . . Together with others of much the same sort, they provide 
the shared basis for theory choice. 6 
Two sorts of problems arise when one attempts to use them. 
Individually the criteria are imprecise: individuals may legitimately differ 
about their applicability to concrete cases. In addition, when deployed to-
gether, they repeatedly prove to conflict with one another; accuracy may, for 
example, dictate the choice of one theory, scope the choice of its competitor. 7 
For reasons of these sorts-and others as well-individual scientists may, at 
a given moment, differ regarding a particular choice of theories. In the course 
of time, however, the interactions among individual members of the community 
of scientists produce a consensus for the group. Individual choices inevitably de-
pend upon idiosyncratic and subjective factors; only the outcome of the group ac-
tivity can be considered objective and fully rational. 
One of Kuhn's major claims seems to be that observation and experiment, in 
conjunction with hypothetico-deductive reasoning, do not adequately account for 
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the choice of scientific theories. This has led some philosophers to believe that 
theory choice is not rational. Kuhn, in contrast, has tried to locate the additional 
factors that are involved. These additional factors constitute a crucial aspect of 
scientific rationality. 
§2. Bayes's Theorem 
The first step in coming to grips with the problem of evaluating and choosing 
scientific hypotheses or theories8 is the recognition of the inadequacy of the tradi-
tional hypothetico-deductive (H-D) schema as a characterization of the logic of 
science. According to this schema, we confirm a scientific hypothesis by deduc-
ing from it, in conjunction with suitable initial conditions and auxiliary hypothe-
ses, an observational prediction that turns out to be true. The H-D method has 
a number of well-known shortcomings. (1) It does not take account of alternative 
hypotheses that might be invoked to explain the same prediction. (2) It makes no 
reference to the initial plausibility of the hypothesis being evaluated. (3) It cannot 
accommodate cases, such as the testing of statistical hypotheses, in which the ob-
served outcome is not deducible from the hypothesis (in conjunction with the per-
tinent initial conditions and auxiliary hypotheses), but only rendered more or less 
probable. 
In view of these and other considerations, many logical empiricists agreed 
with Kuhn regarding the inadequacy of hypothetico-deductive confirmation. A 
number-including Carnap and Reichenbach-appealed to Bayes's theorem, 
which may be written in the following form: 
P(T I E.B) = P(T I B)P(E I B. T) 
P(T\ B)P(E \B.T) + P(-T\B)P(E I B . -T) (1) 
Let "T" stand for the theory or hypothesis being tested, "B" for our background 
information, and "E" for some new evidence we have just acquired. Then the ex-
pression on the left-hand side of the equation represents the probability of our 
hypothesis on the basis of the background information and the new evidence. This 
is known as the posterior probability. The right-hand side of the equation contains 
four probability expressions. Two of these, P(T \ B) and P( -T \ B), are called 
prior probabilities; they represent the probability, on the basis of background in-
formation alone, without taking account of the new evidence E, that our hypothe-
sis is true or false respectively. Obviously the two prior probabilities must add 
up to one; if the value of one of them is known, the value of the other can be in-
ferred immediately. The remaining two probabilities, P(E \ T.B) and 
P(E 1-T.B), are known as likelihoods; they are, respectively, the probability that 
the new evidence would occur if our hypothesis were true and the probability that 
it would occur if our hypothesis were false. The two likelihoods, in contrast to 
the two prior probabilities, must be established independently; the value of one 
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does not automatically determine the value of the other. To calculate the posterior 
probability of our hypothesis, then, we need three separate probability values to 
plug into the right-hand side of Bayes's theorem-a prior probability and two 
likelihoods. 
Before attempting to resolve any important issues concerning the nature of 
scientific reasoning, let us look at a simple and noncontroversial application of 
Bayes's theorem. Consider a factory that produces can openers at the rate of 6,000 
per day. This factory has two machines, a new one that produces 5,000 can 
openers per day and an old one that produces 1,000 per day. Among the can 
openers produced by the new machine 1 percent are defective; among those 
produced by the old machine 3 percent are defective. We pick one can opener 
at random from today's production and find it defective. What is the probability 
that it was produced by the new machine? 
We can get the answer to this question via Bayes's theorem. If we let "B" stand 
for the class of can openers produced in this factory today, "T" for the class of 
can openers produced by the new machine, and "E" for a can opener that is defec-
tive, then the probability we seek is the posterior probability P(T I B. E)- the prob-
ability that a defective can opener from today's production was produced by the 
new machine. The values of the prior probabilities and likelihoods have been 
given, namely: 
P(TjB) = 516 
P(EjT.B) = 11100 
P( -T I B) = 1/6 
P(Ej -T.B) = 3/100. 
Plugging these values into equation (1) immediately yields P(T I B.E) = 5/8. No-
tice that the old machine has a greater probability of producing a defective can 
opener than does the new, but the probability that a defective can opener was 
produced by the new machine is greater than that it was produced by the old one. 
This results, obviously, from the fact that the new machine produces so many 
more can openers overall than does the old one. 
One way to look at this example is to consider the hypothesis T that a given 
can opener was produced by the new machine. This is a causal hypothesis. Our 
background information B is simply that the can opener is part of today's produc-
tion at this factory. On the basis of this prior information, we can evaluate the 
prior probability of T; it is 5/6. Now we add to our knowledge about this can 
opener the information E that it is defective. This knowledge is relevant to the 
hypothesis that it was produced by the new machine; the posterior probability is 
5/8. Although one does not need to appeal to Bayes's theorem to establish this 
result, 9 the highly artificial example shows clearly just how Bayes's theorem can 
be used to ascertain the posterior probability of a simple causal hypothesis. 
When we come to more realistic scientific cases, it is not so easy to see how 
to apply Bayes's theorem; the prior probabilities may seem particularly difficult. 
I believe that, in fact, they reflect the plausibility arguments scientists often bring 
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to bear in their deliberations about scientific hypotheses. I shall discuss this issue 
in §4; indeed, in subsequent sections we shall have to take a close look at all of 
the probabilities that enter into Bayes's theorem. 
In this section I have been concerned to present Bayes's theorem and to make 
a few preliminary remarks about its application to the problem of evaluating 
scientific hypotheses. In the next section I shall try to spell out the connections 
between Bayes's theorem and Kuhn's views on the nature of theory choice. Before 
moving on to that discussion, however, I want to present two other useful forms 
in which Bayes's theorem can be given. In the first place, because of the theorem 
on total probability: 
P(EIB) = P(TIB) P(EIT.B) + P(-TIB) P(El-T.B}, (2) 
equation (1) can obviously be rewritten as: 
I P(TIB) x P(EIB.T) P(T E.B) = · 
P(EIB) 
(3) 
In the second place, equation (1) can be generalized to handle several alternative 
hypotheses, instead of just one hypothesis and its negation, as follows: 
P(Ti I B) x P(E I Ti.B) 
P(Td B.E) = -k --'-------'----
.I: [P(TjlB) x P(EITj.B)] 
J=l 
(4) 
where Ti- Tk are mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternative hypotheses and 
1 sis k. 
Strictly speaking, (4) is the form that is needed for realistic historical 
examples-such as the corpuscular (T1) and wave (T2) theories of light in the 
nineteenth century. In that case, although we could construe T1 and T2 as mutu-
ally exclusive, we could not legitimately consider them exhaustive, for we cannot 
be sure that one or the other is true. Therefore, we would have to introduce T 3 -
what Abner Shimony has called the catchall hypothesis - which says that Ti and 
T2 are both false. T1 - T3 thus constitute a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set 
of hypotheses. This is the sort of situation that obtains when scientists are attempt-
ing to choose a correct hypothesis from among two or more serious candidates. 
§3. Kuhn and Bayes 
For purposes of discussion, Kuhn is willing to admit that "each scientist 
chooses between competing theories by deploying some Bayesian algorithm 
which permits him to compute a value for P(T IE), i.e., for the probability of the 
theory T on the evidence E available both to him and the other members of his 
professional group at a particular period of time. "10 He then formulates the cru-
cial issue in terms of the question of whether there is one unique algorithm used 
by all rational scientists, yielding a unique value for P, or whether different scien-
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tists, though fully rational, may use different algorithms yielding different values 
of P. I want to suggest a third possibility to account for the phenomena of theory 
choice-namely, that many different scientists might use the same algorithm, but 
nevertheless arrive at different values of P. 
When one speaks of a Bayesian algorithm, the first thought that comes to mind 
is Bayes's theorem itself, as embodied in any of the equations (1), (3) or (4). We 
have, for instance: 
I P(TjB) x P(EIB.T) P(T E.B) = ' 
P(E IB) 
(3) 
which constitutes an algorithm in the most straightforward sense of the term. Let 
us call P(E I B) the expectedness of the evidence. Given values for the prior proba-
bility, likelihood, and expectedness, the value of the posterior probability can be 
computed by trivial arithmetical operations. 11 
If we propose to use equation (3) as an algorithm, the obvious question is how 
to get values for the expressions on the right-hand side. Several answers are pos-
sible in principle, depending on what interpretation of the probability concept is 
espoused. If one adopts a Carnapian approach to inductive logic and confirmation 
theory, all of the probabilities that appear in Bayes's theorem can be derived a 
priori from the structure of the descriptive language and the definition of degree 
of confirmation. Since it is extremely difficult to see how any genuine scientific 
case could be handled by means of the highly restricted apparatus available within 
that approach, not many philosophers are tempted to follow this line. Moreover, 
even if a rich descriptive language were available, it is not philosophically tempt-
ing to suppose that the probabilities associated with serious scientific theories are 
a priori semantic truths. 
Two major alternatives remain. First, one might maintain that the probabilities 
on the right-hand side of (3)- especially the prior probability P(T I B)- are objec-
tive and empirical. I have attempted to defend the view that they refer, at bottom, 
to the frequencies with which various kinds of hypotheses or theories have been 
found successful. 12 Clearly, enormous difficulties are involved in working out 
that alternative; I shall return to the issue below. In the meantime, let us consider 
the other-far more popular-alternative. 
The remaining alternative approach involves the use of personal probabilities. 
Personal probabilities are subjective in character; they represent subjective 
degrees of conviction on the part of the individual who has them, provided that 
they fulfill the condition of coherence. 13 Consider a somewhat idealized situation. 
Suppose that, in the presence of background knowledge B (which may include 
initial conditions, boundary conditions, and auxiliary hypotheses) theory T 
deductively entails evidence E. This is the situation to which the hypothetico-
RATIONALITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE 181 
deductive method appears to be applicable. In this case, P(E IT .B) must equal 1, 
and equation (3) reduces to: 
P(TIE.B) = P(TiB)/P(EiB). (5) 
One might then ask a particular scientist for his or her plausibility rating of theory 
T on background knowledge B alone, quite irrespective of whether evidence E 
obtains or not. Likewise, the same individual may be queried regarding the de-
gree to which evidence E is to be expected irrespective of the truth or falsity of 
T. According to the personalist, it should be possible-by direct questioning or 
by some less direct method-to elicit such psychological facts regarding a scien-
tist involved in investigations concerning the theory in question. This information 
is sufficient to determine the degree of belief this individual should have in the 
theory T given the background knowledge Band the evidence E, namely, the 
posterior probability P(T I E.B). 
In the more general case, when T and B do not deductively entail E, the proce-
dure is the same, except that the value of P(E I T. B) must also be ascertained. In 
many contexts, where statistical significance tests can be applied, a value of the 
likelihood P(E IT .B) can be calculated, and the personal probability will coincide 
with the value thus derived. In any case, whether statistical tests apply or not, 
there is no new problem in principle involved in procuring the needed degree of 
confidence. This reflects the standard Bayesian approach in which all of the prob-
abilities are taken to be personal probabilities. 
In any case, whether one adopts an objective or a personalistic interpretation 
of probability, equation (3)-or some other version of Bayes's theorem-can be 
taken as an algorithm for evaluating scientific hypotheses or theories. Individual 
scientists, using the same algorithm, may arrive at different evaluations of the 
same hypothesis because they plug in different values for the probabilities. If the 
probabilities are construed as objective, different individuals may well have 
different estimates of these objective values. If the probabilities are construed as 
personal, different individuals may well have different subjective assessments of 
them. Bayes's theorem provides a mechanical algorithm, but the judgments of in-
dividual scientists are involved in procuring the values that are to be fed into it. 
This is a general feature of algorithms; they are not responsible for the data they 
are given. 
§4. Prior Probabilities 
In §2 I remarked that the prior probabilities in Bayes's theorem can best be seen 
as embodying the kinds of plausibility judgments that scientists regularly make 
regarding the hypotheses with which they are concerned. Einstein, who was 
clearly aware of this consideration, contrasted two points of view from which a 
theory can be criticized or evaluated: 
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The first point of view is obvious: the theory must not contradict empirical 
facts. . . . [it] is concerned with the confirmation of the theoretical founda-
tion by the available empirical facts. The second point of view is not con-
cerned with the relation of the material of observation but with the premises 
of the theory itself, with what may briefly but vaguely be characterized as the 
"naturalness" or "logical simplicity" of the premises. . . . The second point 
of view may briefly be characterized as concerning itself with the "inner per-
fection" of a theory, whereas the first point of view refers to the "external con-
firmation. "14 
Einstein's second point of view is the sort of thing I have in mind in referring to 
plausibility arguments or judgments concerning prior probabilities. 
Plausibility considerations are pervasive in the sciences; they play a 
significant-indeed, indispensable-role. This fact provides the initial reason for 
appealing to Bayes's theorem as an aid to understanding the logic of evaluating 
scientific hypotheses. Plausibility arguments serve to enhance or diminish the 
probability of a given hypothesis prior to-i.e., without reference to-the out-
come of a particular observation or experiment. They are designed to answer the 
question, "Is this the kind of hypothesis that is likely to succeed in the scientific 
situation in which the scientist finds himself or herself?" On the basis of their 
training and experience, scientists are qualified to make such judgments. 
This point can best be explained, I believe, in terms of concrete examples. 
Since before the time of Newton, for instance, a well-known plausibility argu-
ment for the inverse square character of gravitational forces has been around. It 
is natural to think of the gravitational force emanating from a particle of matter 
as one that spreads spherically from it in a uniform manner. In the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries all competent physical scientists believed that physical 
space has a three-dimensional Euclidean structure. Since the surface of a Euclid-
ean sphere increases as the square of the radius, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the force of gravity is diluted in just the same way, for the farther one goes from 
the particle, the greater the spherical surface over which the force must be spread. 
A famous Canadian study of the effects of the consumption of large doses of 
saccharin provides another example. 15 A statistically significant association be-
tween heavy saccharin consumption and bladder cancer in a controlled experi-
ment with rats lends considerable plausibility to the hypothesis that use of saccha-
rin as an artificial sweetener in diet soft drinks increases the risk of bladder cancer 
in humans. This example, unlike the preceding one, is inherently statistical and 
does not have even the prima facie appearance of a hypothetico-deductive in-
ference. 
In order to come to a clearer understanding of the nature of prior probabilities, 
it will be necessary to look at them from the point of view of the personalist and 
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that of the objectivist (frequency or propensity theorist). 16 The frightening thing 
about pure unadulterated personalism is that nothing prevents prior probabilities 
(and other probabilities as well) from being determined by all sorts of idiosyn-
cratic and objectively irrelevant considerations. A given hypothesis might get an 
extremely low prior probability because the scientist considering it has a hang-
over, has had a recent fight with his or her lover, is in passionate disagreement 
with the politics of the scientist who first advanced the hypothesis, harbors deep 
prejudices against the ethnic group to which the originator of the hypothesis be-
longs, etc. What we want to demand is that the investigator make every effort to 
bring all of his or her relevant experience in evaluating hypotheses to bear on the 
question of whether the hypothesis under consideration is of a type likely to suc-
ceed, and to leave aside emotional irrelevancies. 
It is rather easy to construct really perverse systems of belief that do not violate 
the coherence requirement. But we need to keep in mind the objectives of science. 
When we have a long series of events, such as tosses of fair or biased coins, or 
radioactive decays of unstable nuclei, we want our subjective degrees of convic-
tion to match what either a frequency theorist or a propensity theorist would re-
gard as the objective probability. Carnap was profoundly correct in his notion that 
inductive or logical or epistemic probabilities should be reasonable estimates of 
relative frequencies. 
A sensible personalist, I would suggest, is someone who wants his or her per-
sonal probabilities to reflect objective fact. Betting on a sequence of tosses of a 
coin, a personalist wants not only to avoid Dutch books, 17 but also to stand a 
reasonable chance of winning (or of not losing too much too fast). As I read it, 
the whole point of F. P. Ramsey's famous article on degrees of belief is to con-
sider what you get if your subjective degrees of belief match the relevant frequen-
cies. 18 One of the facts recognized by the sensible personalist is that whether the 
coin lands heads or tails is not affected by on which side of the bed he or she got 
out that morning. Ifwe grant that the personalist's aim is to do as well as possible 
in betting on heads and tails, it would be obviously counterproductive to allow 
the betting odds to be affected by such irrelevancies. 
The same general sort of consideration should be brought to bear on the assign-
ment of probabilities to hypotheses. Whether a particular scientist is dyspeptic on 
a given morning is irrelevant to the question of whether a physical hypothesis that 
is under consideration is correct or not. Much more troubling, of course, is the 
fact that any given scientist may be inadvertantly influenced by ideological or 
metaphysical prejudices. It is obvious that an unconscious commitment to capital-
ism or racism might seriously affect theorizing in the behavioral sciences. 
Similar situations may arise in the physical sciences as well; another historical 
example will illustrate the point. In 1800 Alessandro Volta invented the battery, 
thereby providing scientists with a way of producing steady electrical currents. 
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It was not until 1820 that Hans Christian Oersted discovered the effect of an elec-
trical current on a magnetic needle. Why was there such a delay? One reason was 
the previously established fact that a static electric charge has no effect on a mag-
netic needle. Another reason that has been mentioned is the fact that, contrary 
to the expectation if there were such an effect, it aligns the needle perpendicular 
to the current carrying wire. As Holton and Brush remark, "But even if one has 
currents and compass needles available, one does not observe the effect unless 
the compass is placed in the right position so that the needle can respond to a force 
that seems to act in a direction around the current rather than toward it. "19 I found 
it amusing when, on one occasion, a colleague set up the demonstration with the 
magnetic needle oriented at right angles to the wire to show why the experiment 
fails if one begins with the needle in that position. When the current was turned 
on, the needle rotated through 180 degrees; he had neglected to take account of 
polarity. How many times, between 1800 and 1820, had the experiment been per-
formed without reversing the polarity? Not many. The experiment had apparently 
not been tried by others because of Cartesian metaphysical commitments. It was 
undertaken by Oersted as a result of his proclivities toward naturphilosophie. 
How should scientists go about evaluating the prior probabilities of hypothe-
ses? In elaborating a view he calls tempered persona/ism, -a view that goes be-
yond standard Bayesian personalism by placing further constraints on personal 
probabilities - Shimony20 points out that experience shows that the hypotheses 
seriously advanced by serious scientists stand some chance of being successful. 
Science has, in fact, made considerable progress over the past four or five centu-
ries, which constitutes strong empirical evidence that the probability of success 
among members of this class is nonvanishing. Likewise, hard experience has also 
taught us to reject claims of scientific infallibility. Thus, we have good reasons 
for avoiding the assignment of extreme values to the priors of the hypotheses with 
which we are seriously concerned. Moreover, Shimony reminds us, experience 
has taught that science is difficult and frustrating; consequently, we ought to as-
sign fairly low prior probabilities to the hypotheses that have been explicitly ad-
vanced, allowing a fairly high prior for the catchall hypothesis-the hypothesis 
that we have not yet thought of the correct hypothesis. The history of science 
abounds with situations of choice among theories in which the successful candi-
date has not even been conceived at the time. 
In The Foundations of Scientific Inference, I proposed that the problem of prior 
probabilities be approached in terms of an objective interpretation of probability, 
in particular, the frequency interpretation. I suggested three sorts of criteria that 
can be brought to bear in assessing the prior probabilities of hypotheses: formal, 
material, and pragmatic. 
Pragmatic criteria have to do with the circumstances in which a new hypothe-
sis originates. We have already seen an example of a pragmatic criterion in 
Shimony's observation that hypotheses advocated by serious scientists have non-
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vanishing chances of success. The opposite side of the same coin is provided by 
Martin Gardner, who offers an enlightening characterization of scientific 
cranks.21 Since it is doubtful that a single useful scientific suggestion has ever 
been originated by anyone in that category, hypotheses advanced by people of that 
ilk have negligible chances of being correct. I recall when L. Ron Hubbard's Dia-
netics was first published. A psychologist friend, asked what he thought of it, 
said, "I can't condemn this book before reading it, but after I have read it, I will." 
When competent scientists offer hypotheses outside of their areas of specializa-
tion, we have a right to wonder whether appreciable plausibility accrues to such 
suggestions. Hubbard was, incidentally, an engineer with no training in 
psychology. 
The formal criteria have to do not only with matters of internal consistency 
of a new hypothesis, but also with relations of entailment or incompatibility of 
the new hypothesis with accepted laws and theories. The fact that Immanuel 
Velikovski's Worlds in Collision 22 contradicts many of the accepted basic laws 
of physics- e.g., the law of conservation of angular momentum -renders his 'ex-
planations' of such biblically reported incidents as the parting of the waters of the 
Red Sea and the brief interruption of the rotation of the earth (the sun standing 
still) utterly implausible. 
It should be recalled that among his five considerations for the evaluation of 
scientific theories - mentioned above- Kuhn includes consistency of the sort we 
are discussing. I take this as a powerful hint that one of the main issues Kuhn has 
raised about scientific theory choice involves the use of prior probabilities and 
plausibility judgments. 
The material criteria have to do with the actual structure and content of the 
hypothesis or theory under consideration. The most obvious example is 
simplicity-another of Kuhn's five items. Simplicity strikes me as singularly im-
portant, for it has often been treated by scientists and philosophers as an a priori 
criterion. It has been suggested, for example, that the hypothesis that quarks are 
fundamental constitutents of matter loses plausibility as the number of different 
types of quarks increases, since it becomes less simple as a result. 23 It has also 
been advocated as a universal methodological maxim: Search for the simplest 
possible hypothesis. Only if the simpler hypotheses do not stand up under testing 
should one resort to more complex hypotheses. 
Although simplicity has obviously been an important consideration in the 
physical sciences, its applicability in the social/behavioral sciences is 
problematic. In a recent article, "Slips of the Tongue," Michael T. Motley criti-
cizes Freud's theory for being too simple-an oversimplification. 
Further still, the categorical nature of Freud's claim that all slips have hidden 
meanings makes it rather unattractive. It is difficult to imagine, for example, 
that my six-year-old daughter's mealtime request to "help cut up my meef' was 
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the result of repressed anxieties or anything of that kind. It seems more likely 
that she simply merged "meat" and "beef' into "meef." Similarly, about the 
only meaning one can easily read into someone's saying "roon mock" instead 
of "moon rock" is that the m and r got switched. Even so, how does it happen 
that words can merge or sounds can be switched in the course of speech 
production? And in the case of my "pleased to beat you" error [to a competitor 
for a job], might Freud have been right?24 
The most reasonable way to look at simplicity, I think, is to regard it as a 
highly relevant characteristic, but one whose applicability varies from one scien-
tific context to another. Specialists in any given branch of science make judg-
ments about the degree of simplicity or complexity that is appropriate to the con-
text at hand, and they do so on the basis of extensive experience in that particular 
area of scientific investigation. Since there is no precise measure of simplicity as 
applied to scientific hypotheses and theories, scientists must use their judgment 
concerning the degree of simplicity a given hypothesis or theory possesses and 
concerning the degree of simplicity that is desirable in the given context. The kind 
of judgment to which I refer is not spooky; it is the kind of judgment that arises 
on the basis of training and experience. This experience is far too rich to be the 
sort of thing that can be spelled out explicitly. As Patrick Suppes25 has pointed 
out, the assignment of prior probability by the Bayesian can be regarded as the 
best estimate of the chances of success of the hypothesis or theory on the basis 
of all relevant experience in that particular scientific domain. The personal proba-
bility represents, not an effort to contaminate science with subjective irrelevan-
cies, but rather an attempt to facilitate the inclusion of all relevant evidence. 
Simplicity is only one among many material criteria. Another closely related 
criterion - frequently employed in contemporary physics - is symmetry. Perhaps 
the most striking historical example is de Broglie's hypothesis regarding matter 
waves. Since light exhibits both particle and wave behavior, which are linked in 
terms of linear momentum, he suggested, why should not material particles, 
which obviously possess linear momentum, also have such wave characteristics 
as wave length and frequency? Unbeknownst to de Broglie, experimental work 
by Davisson was, at that very time, providing positive evidence of wavelike be-
havior of electrons. 
A third widely used material criterion is analogy, as illustrated by the saccha-
rin study. The physiological analogy between rats and humans is sufficiently 
strong to lend considerable plausibility to the hypothesis that saccharin can cause 
bladder cancer in humans. I suspect that the use of arguments by analogy in 
science is almost always aimed at establishing prior probabilities. The formal 
criteria enable us to take account of the ways in which a given hypothesis fits 
deductively with what else we know. Analogy helps us to assess the degree to 
which a given hypothesis fits inductively with what else we know. 
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The moral I would draw concerning prior probabilities is that they can be un-
derstood as our best estimates of the frequencies with which certain kinds of hy-
potheses succeed. These estimates are rough and inexact; some philosophers 
might prefer to think of them in terms of intervals. If, however, one wants to con-
strue them as personal probabilities, there is no harm in it, as long as we attribute 
to the subject who has them the aim of bringing to bear all his or her experience 
that is relevant to the success or failure of hypotheses similar to that being consid-
ered. The personalist and the frequentist need not be in any serious disagreement 
over the construal of prior probabilities. 26 
One point is apt to be immediately troublesome. If we are to use Bayes's the-
orem to compute values of posterior probabilities, it would appear that we must 
be prepared to furnish numerical values for the prior probabilities. Unfor-
tunately, it seems preposterous to suppose that plausibility arguments of the kind 
we have considered could yield exact numerical values. The usual answer is that, 
because of a phenomenon known as "washing out of the priors" or "swamping of 
the priors," even very crude estimates of the prior probabilities will suffice for 
the kinds of scientific judgments we are concerned to make. Obviously, however, 
this sort of convergence depends upon agreement regarding the likelihoods. 
§5. The Expectedness 
The term "P(E I B)" occurring in the denominator of equation (3) is called the 
expectedness because it is the opposite of surprisingness. The smaller the value 
of P(E I B), the more surprising Eis; the larger the value of P(E I B), the less sur-
prising, and hence, the more expected Eis. Since the expectedness occurs in the 
denominator, a smaller value tends to increase the value of the fraction. This con-
forms to a widely held intuition that the more surprising the predictions a theory 
can make, the greater is their evidential value when they come true. 
A classic example of a surprising prediction that came true is the Poisson 
bright spot. If we ask someone who is completely naive about theories of light 
how probable it is that a bright spot appears in the center of the shadow of a 
brightly illuminated circular object (ball or disk), we would certainly anticipate 
the response that it is very improbable indeed. There is a good inductive basis 
for this answer. In our everyday lives we have all observed many shadows of 
opaque objects, and they do not contain bright spots at their centers. Once, when 
I demonstrated the Poisson bright spot to an introductory class, one student care-
fully scrutinized the ball bearing that cast the shadow because he strongly sus-
pected that it had a hole through it. 
Another striking example, to my mind, is the Cavendish torsion-balance ex-
periment. If we ask someone who is totally ignorant of Newton's theory of univer-
sal gravitation how strongly they expect to find a force of attraction between a 
lead ball and a pith ball in a laboratory, I should think the answer, again, would 
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be that it is very unlikely. There is, in this example as well, a sound inductive 
basis for the response. We are all familiar with the gravitational attraction of 
ordinary-size objects to the earth, but we do not have everyday experience of an 
attraction between two such relatively small (electrically neutral and unmagne-
tized) objects as those Cavendish used to perform his experiment. Newton's the-
ory predicts, of course, that there will be a gravitational attraction between any 
two material objects. The trick was to figure out how to measure it. 
As the foregoing two examples show, there is a possible basis for assigning 
a low value to the expectedness; it was made plausible by assuming that the sub-
ject was completely naive concerning the relevant physical theory. The trouble 
with this approach is that a person who wants to use Bayes's theorem -in the form 
of equation (3), say-cannot be totally innocent of the theory T that is to be evalu-
ated, since the other terms in the equation refer explicitly to T. Consequently, 
we have to recognize the relationship between P(E I B) and the prior probabilities 
and likelihoods that appear on the right-hand side in the theorem on total proba-
bility: 
P(EjB) = P(TIB) P(EIT.B) + P(-TIB) P(EI -T.B). (2) 
Suppose that the prior probability of T is not negligible and that T, in conjunction 
with suitable initial conditions, entails E. Under these circumstances E cannot be 
totally surprising; the expectedness cannot be vanishingly small. Moreover, to 
evaluate the expectedness of Ewe must also consider its probability if T is false. 
By focusing on the expectedness, we cannot really avoid dealing with likelihoods. 
There is a further difficulty. Suppose, for example, that the wave theory of 
light is true. It is surely true enough in the context of the Poisson bright spot ex-
periment. If we want to evaluate P(E I B) we must include in B the initial condi-
tions of the experiment-the circular object illuminated by a bright light in such 
a way that the shadow falls upon a screen. Given the truth of the wave theory, 
the objective probability of the bright spot is one, for whenever those initial condi-
tions are realized, the bright spot appears. It makes no difference whether we 
know that the wave theory is true, or believe it, or reject it, or have ever thought 
of it. Under the conditions specified in B the bright spot invariably occurs. Inter-
preted either as a frequency or a propensity, P(E I B) = 1. If we are to avoid 
trivialization in many important cases, the expectedness must be treated as a per-
sonal probability. To anyone who, like me, wants to base scientific theory prefer-
ence or choice on objective considerations, this result poses a serious problem. 
The net result is a twofold problem. First, by focusing on the expectedness, 
we do not escape the need to deal explicitly with the likelihoods. In §6 I shall dis-
cuss the difficulties that arise when we focus on the likelihoods, especially the 
problem of the likelihood on the catchall hypothesis. Second, the expectedness 
defies interpretation as an objective probability. In §7 I shall propose a strategy 
for avoiding involvement with either the expectedness or the likelihood on the 
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catchall. That maneuver will, I hope, keep open the possibility of an objective 
basis for the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. 
§6. Likelihoods 
Equations (1), (3), and (4) are different forms of Bayes's theorem, and each 
of them contains a likelihood, P(E I T.B), in the numerator. Two trivial cases can 
be noted at the outset. First, ifthe conjunction of theory T and background knowl-
edge Bare logically incompatible with evidence E, the likelihood equals zero, and 
the posterior probability, P(T I E.B), automatically becomes zero. 27 Second, as 
we have already noticed, if T .B entails E, that likelihood equals one, and conse-
quently drops out, as in equation (5). 
Another easy case occurs when the hypothesis T involves various kinds of ran-
domness assumptions, for example, the independence of a series of trials on a 
chance setup. 28 Consider, for example, the case of a coin that has been tossed 100 
times, with the result that heads showed in 63 cases and tails in 37. We assume 
that the tosses are independent, but we are concerned whether the system consist-
ing of the coin and tossing mechanism is biased. Calculation shows that the proba-
bility, given an unbiased coin and tossing mechanism, of the actual frequency of 
heads differing from 112 by 20 percent or more on 100 tosses (i.e., falling outside 
of the range 40 to 60) is about .05. Thus, the likelihood of the outcome on the 
hypothesis that the coin and mechanism are fair is less than . 05. On the hypothesis 
that the coin has a 60 to 40 bias for heads, by contrast, the probability that the 
number of heads in 100 trials differs from 6/10 by less than 20 percent (i.e., lies 
within the 48 to 72 range) is well above . 95. These are the kinds of likelihoods 
that would be used to compare the null hypothesis that the coin is fair with the 
hypothesis that it has a certain bias. 29 This example typifies a wide variety of 
cases, including the above-mentioned controlled experiment on rats and saccha-
rin, in which statistical significance tests are applied. These yield a comparison 
between the probability of the observed result if the hypothesis is correct and the 
probability of the same result on a null hypothesis. 
In still another kind of situation the likelihood P(EIT.B) is straightforward. 
Consider, for example, the case in which a physician takes an X ray for diagnostic 
purposes. Let T be the hypothesis that the patient has a particular disease and let 
Ebe a certain appearance on the film. From long medical experience it may be 
known that E occurs in 90 percent of all cases in which that disease is present. 
In many cases, as this example suggests, there may be accumulated frequency 
data from which the value of P(E IT .B) can be derived. 
Unfortunately, life with likelihoods is not always as simple as the foregoing 
cases suggest. Consider an important case, which I will present in a highly un-
historical way. In comparing the Copernican and Ptolemaic cosmologies, it is 
easy to see that the phases of Venus are critical. According to the Copernican sys-
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tern, Venus should exhibit a broad set of phases from a narrow crescent to an al-
most full disk. According to the Ptolemaic system, Venus should always present 
nearly the same crescent-shaped appearance. One of Galileo's celebrated tele-
scopic observations was of the phases of Venus. The likelihood of such evidence 
on the Copernican system is unity; on the Ptolemaic it is zero. This is the decisive 
sort of case that we cherish. 
The Copernican system did, however, face one serious obstacle. On the 
Ptolemaic system, because the earth does not move, the fixed stars should not ap-
pear to change their positions. On the Copernican system, because the earth 
makes an annual trip around the sun, the fixed stars should appear to change their 
positions in the course of the year. The very best astronomical observations, in-
cluding those of Tycho Brahe, failed to reveal any observable stellar parallax. 30 
However, it was realized that, ifthe fixed stars are ata very great distance from 
the earth, stellar parallax, though real, would be too small to be observed. Conse-
quently, the likelihood P(EIT.B), where Tis the Copernican system and Ethe 
absence of observable stellar parallax, is not zero. At the time of the scientific 
revolution, prior to the advent of Newtonian mechanics, there seemed no 
reasonable way to evaluate this likelihood. The assumption that the fixed stars are 
almost unimaginably distant from the earth was a highly ad hoc, and consequently 
implausible, auxiliary hypothesis to adopt just to save the Copernican system. 
Among other things, Christians did not like the idea that heaven was so very far 
away. 
The most reasonable resolution of this anomaly was offered by Tycho Brahe, 
whose cosmology placed the earth at rest, with the sun and moon moving in orbits 
around the earth, but with all of the other planets moving in orbits around the sun. 
In this way both the observed phases of Venus and the absence of observable stel-
lar parallax could be accomodated. Until Newton's dynamics came upon the 
scene, it seems to me, Tycho's system was clearly the best available theory. 
In §2 I suggested that the following form of Bayes's theorem is the most ap-
propriate for use in actual scientific cases in which more than one hypothesis is 
available for serious consideration: 
P(T;jB) x P(EITi.B) 
P(TilB.E) = -k--------
. I: [P(Tj I B) x P(E I Tj.B)] 
J=l 
(4) 
It certainly fits the foregoing example in which we compared the Ptolemaic, 
Copernican, and Tychonic systems. This equation involves a mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive setofhypotheses T1, ... , Tk- l, Tk, where T1 -Tk- l are seri-
ously entertained and Tk is the catchall. Thus, the scientist who wants to calculate 
the posterior probability of one particular hypothesis T; on the basis of evidence 
E must ascertain likelihoods of three types: (1) the probability of evidence E given 
Ti, (2) the probability of that evidence on each of the other seriously considered 
RATIONALITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE 191 
alternatives Tj G =f::. i, j =f::. k), and (3) the probability of that evidence on the catch-
all Tk. 
In considering the foregoing example, I suggested that, although likelihoods 
in the first two categories are sometimes straightforward, there are cases in which 
they tum out to be quite problematic. We shall look at more examples in which 
they present difficulties as our discussion proceeds. But the point to be empha-
sized right now is the utter intractability of the likelihood on the catchall. The rea-
son for this difficulty is easy to see. Whereas the seriously considered candidates 
are bona fide hypotheses, the catchall is a hypothesis only in a Pickwickian sense. 
It refers to all of the hypotheses we are not taking seriously, including all those 
that have not been thought of as yet; indeed, the catchall is logically equivalent 
to their disjunction. These will often include brilliant discoveries in the future his-
tory of science that will eventually solve our most perplexing problems. 
Among the hypotheses hidden in the catchall are some that, in conjunction with 
present available background information, entail the present evidence E. On such 
as-yet-undiscovered hypotheses the likelihood is one. Obviously, however, the 
fact that its probability on one particular hypothesis is unity does not entail any-
thing about its probability on some disjunction containing that hypothesis as one 
of its disjuncts. These considerations suggest to me that the likelihood on the 
catchall is totally intractable. To try to evaluate the likelihood on the catchall in-
volves, it seems to me, an attempt to guess the future history of science. That is 
something we cannot do with any reliability. 
In any situation in which a small number of theories are competing for ascen-
dency it is tempting, though quite illegitimate, simply to ignore the likelihood on 
the catchall. In the nineteenth century, for instance, scientists asked what the 
probability of a given phenomenon is on the wave theory of light and what it is 
on the corpuscular theory. They did not seriously consider its probability if nei-
ther of these theories is correct. Yet we see, from the various forms in which 
Bayes's theorem is written, that either the expectedness or the likelihood on the 
catchall is an indispensable ingredient. In the next section I shall offer a legitima.te 
way of eliminating those probabilities from our consideration. 
§7. Choosing Between Theories 
Kuhn has often maintained that in actual science the problem is never to evalu-
ate one particular hypothesis or theory in isolation; it is always a matter of choos-
ing from among two or more viable alternatives. He has emphasized that an old 
theory is never completely abandoned unless there is currently available a rival 
to take its place. Given that circumstance, it is a matter of choosing between the 
old and the new. On this point I think that Kuhn is quite right, especially as 
regards reasonably mature sciences. And this insight provides a useful clue on 
how to use Bayes's theorem to explicate the logic of scientific confirmation. 
192 Wesley C. Salmon 
Suppose that we are trying to choose between Ti and Tz, where there may or 
may not be other serious alternatives in addition to the catchall. By letting i = 
1 and i = 2, we can proceed to write equation (4) for each of these candidates. 
Noting that the denominators of the two are identical, we can form their ratio as 
follows: 
P(Ti I E.B) 
P(T2JE.B) 
P(TiJB) P(EJTi.B) 
P(T2JB) P(EJT2.B) 
(6) 
No reference to the catchall hypothesis appears in this equation. Since the catchall 
is not a bona fide hypothesis, it is not a contender, and we need not try to calculate 
its posterior probability. The use of equation (6) frees us from the need to deal 
either with the expectedness of E or with its probability on the catchall. 
Equation (6) yields a relation that can be regarded as a Bayesian algorithm for 
theory preference. Suppose that, prior to the emergence of evidence E, you prefer 
Ti to Tz; that is, P(TiJB) > P(T2JB). Then E becomes available. You should 
change your preference in the light of E if and only if P(T2 I E.B) >P(Ti J E.B). 
From (6) it follows that 
P(T2JE.B) >P(TiJE.B) iff P(EJT2.B)/(EJTi.B) > (TiJB)/P(T2JB). (7) 
In other words, you should change your preference to T 2 if the ratio of the likeli-
hoods is greater than the reciprocal of the ratio of the respective prior probabili-
ties. A corollary is that, if both Ti.Band Tz.B entail E, so that: 
P(EJTi.B) = P(EJT2.B) = 1, 
the occurrence of E can never change the preference rating between the two com-
peting theories. 
At the end of §4 I made reference to the well-known phenomenon of washing 
out of priors in connection with the use of Bayes's theorem. One might well ask 
what happens to this swamping when we switch from Bayes's theorem to the ratio 
embodied in equation (6). 3i The best answer, I believe, is this. If we are dealing 
with two hypotheses that are serious contenders in the sense that they do not differ 
too greatly in plausibility, the ratio of the priors will be of the order of unity. If, 
as the observational evidence accumulates, the likelihoods come to differ greatly, 
the ratio of the likelihoods will swamp the ratio of the priors. Recall the example 
of the tossed coin. Suppose we consider the prior probability of a fair device to 
be ten times as large as that of a biased device. If about the same proportion of 
heads occurs in 500 tosses as occurred in the aforementioned 100, the likelihood 
on the null hypothesis would be virtually zero and the likelihood on the hypothesis 
that the device has a bias approximating the observed frequency would be essen-
tially indistinguishable from unity. The ratio of prior probabilities would obvi-
ously be completely dominated by the likelihood ratio. 
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§8. Plausible Scenarios 
Although, by appealing to equation (6), we have eliminated the need to deal 
with the expectedness or the likelihood on the catchall, we cannot claim to have 
dealt adequately with the likelihoods on the hypotheses we are seriously consider-
ing, for their values are not always straightforwardly ascertainable. We have al-
ready mentioned one example, namely, the probability of absence of observable 
stellar parallax on the Copernican hypothesis. We noted that, by adding an aux-
iliary hypothesis to the effect that the fixed stars are located an enormous distance 
from the Earth, we could augment the Copernican hypothesis in such a way that 
the likelihood on this augmented hypothesis is one. But, for many reasons, this 
auxiliary assumption could hardly be considered plausible in that historical con-
text. By now, of course, we have measured the parallax of relatively nearby stars, 
and from those values have calculated these distances. They are extremely far 
from us in comparison to the familiar objects in our solar system. 
Consider another well-known example. During the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries the wave and corpuscular theories of light received considerable scien-
tific attention. Each was able to explain certain important optical phenomena, and 
each faced fundamental difficulties. The corpuscular hypothesis easily explained 
how light could travel vast distances through empty space, and it readily ex-
plained sharp shadows. The theory of light as a longitudinal wave explained vari-
ous kinds of diffraction phenomena, but failed to deal adequately with polariza-
tion. When, early in the nineteenth century, light was conceived as a transverse 
wave, the wave theory explained polarization as well as diffraction quite straight-
forwardly. And Huygens had long since shown how the wave theory could 
handle rectilinear propagation and sharp shadows. For most of the nineteenth 
century the wave theory dominated optics. 
The proponent of the particle theory could still raise a serious objection. What 
is the likelihood of a wave propagating in empty space? Lacking a medium, the 
answer is zero. So wave theorists augmented their theory with the auxiliary as-
sumption that all of space is filled with a peculiar substance known as the lu-
miniferous ether. This substance was postulated to have precisely the properties 
required to transmit light waves. 
The process I have been describing can appropriately be regarded as the dis-
covery and introduction of plausible scenarios. A theory is confronted with an 
anomaly-a phenomenon that appears to have a small, possibly zero, likelihood 
given that theory. Proponents of the theory search for some auxiliary hypothesis 
that, if conjoined to the theory, renders the likelihood high, possibly unity. This 
move shifts the burden of the argument to the plausibility of the new auxiliary 
hypothesis. I mentioned two instances involved in the wave theory of light. The 
first was the auxiliary assumption that the wave is transverse. This modification 
of the theory was sufficiently plausible to be incorporated as an integral part of 
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the theory. The second was the luminiferous ether. The plausibility of this aux-
iliary hypothesis was debated throughout the nineteenth, and into the twentieth, 
century. The ether had to be dense enough to transmit transverse waves (which 
require a denser medium than do longitudinal waves) and thin enough to allow 
astronomical bodies to move through it without noticeable diminution of speed. 
Attempts to detect the motion of the earth relative to the ether were unsuccessful. 
The Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction hypothesis was an attempt to save the ether 
theory-that is, another attempt at a plausible scenario-but it was, of course, 
abandoned in favor of special relativity. 
I am calling these auxiliaries scenarios because they are stories about how 
something could have happened, and plausible because they must have some de-
gree of acceptability if they are to be of any help in handling problematic 
phenomena. The wave theory could handle the Poisson bright spot by deducing 
it from the theory. There seemed to be no plausible scenario available to the par-
ticle theory that could deal with this phenomenon. The same has been said with 
respect to Foucault's demonstration that the velocity of light is greater in air than 
it is in water. 32 
One nineteenth century optician of considerable importance who did not adopt 
the wave theory, but remained committed to the Newtonian emission theory, was 
David Brewster. 33 In a "Report on the Present State of Physical Optics," 
presented to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1831, he 
maintained that the undulatory theory is "still burthened with difficulties and can-
not claim our implicit assent."34 Brewster freely admitted the unparalleled ex-
planatory and predictive success of the wave theory; nevertheless, he considered 
it false. 
Among the difficulties Brewster found with the wave theory, two might be 
mentioned. First, he considered the wave theory implausible, for the reason that 
it required "an ether invisible, intangible, imponderable, inseparable from all 
bodies, and extending from our own eye to the remotest verge of the starry 
heavens."35 History has certainly vindicated him on that issue. Second, he found 
the wave theory incapable of explaining a phenomenon that he had discovered 
himself, namely, selective absorption- dark lines in the spectrum of sunlight that 
has passed through certain gases. Brewster points out that a gas may be opaque 
to light of one particular index of refraction in flint glass, while transmitting freely 
light whose refractive indices in the same glass are only the tiniest bit higher or 
lower. Brewster maintained that there was no plausible scenario the wave the-
orists could devise that would explain why the ether permeating the gas transmits 
two waves of very nearly the same wave length, but does not transmit light of 
a very precise wave length lying in between: 
There is no fact analogous to this in the phenomena of sound, and I can form 
no conception of a simple elastic medium so modified by the particles of the 
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body which contains it, as to make such an extraordinary selection of the undu-
lations which it stops or transmits. . . . 36 
Brewster never found a plausible scenario by means of which the Newtonian the-
ory he favored could cope with absorption lines, nor could proponents of the 
wave theory find one to bolster their viewpoint. Dark absorption lines remained 
anomalous for both the wave and particle theories; neither could see a way to fur-
nish them with high likelihood. 
With hindsight we can say that the catchall hypothesis was looking very strong 
at this point. We recognize that the dark absorption lines in the spectrum of sun-
light are closely related to the discrete lines in the emission spectra of gases, and 
that they, in turn, are intimately bound up with the problem of the stability of 
atoms. These phenomena played a major role in the overthrow of classical 
physics at the turn of the twentieth century. 
I have introduced the notion of a plausible scenario to deal with problematic 
likelihoods. Likelihoods can cause trouble for a scientific theory for either of two 
reasons. First, if you have a pet theory that confers an extremely small-for all 
practical purposes zero- likelihood on some observed phenomenon, that is a 
problem for that favored theory. You try to come up with a plausible scenario 
according to which the likelihood will be larger-ideally, unity. Second, if there 
seems to be no way to evaluate the likelihood of a piece of evidence with respect 
to some hypothesis of interest, that is another sort of problem. In this case, we 
search for a plausible scenario that will make the likelihood manageable, whether 
this involves assigning it a high, medium, or low value. 
What does this mean in terms of the Bayesian approach I am advocating? Let 
us return to: 
P(T1 I E.B) 
P(T2 I E.B) 
P(T1 IB) P(EIT1.B) 
P(T2IB) P(EIT2.B) 
(6) 
which contains two likelihoods. Suppose, as in nineteenth-century optics, that 
both likelihoods are problematic. As we have seen, we search for plausible 
scenarios A1 and A2 to augment T 1 and T 2 respectively. If the search has been 
successful, we can assess the likelihoods of E with respect to the augmented the-
ories A1.T1 and A2.T2. Consequently, we can modify (6) so as to yield 
P(A1.TilE.B) P(A1.TilB) P(EIA1.T1.B) (8) 
In order to use this equation to compare the posterior probabilities of the two aug-
mented theories, we must assess the plausibilities of the scenarios, for the prior 
probabilities of both augmented theories-A1.T1 and A2.T2-appear in it. In §4 
I tried to explain how prior probabilities can be handled-that is, how we can ob-
tain at least rough estimates of their values. If, as suggested, the plausible 
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scenarios have made the likelihoods ascertainable, then we can use them in con-
junction with our determinations of the prior probabilities to assess the ratio of 
the posterior probabilities. We have, thereby, handled the central issue raised by 
Kuhn, namely, what is the basis for preference between two theories. 37 Equation 
(8) is a Bayesian algorithm. 
If either augmented theory, in conjunction with background knowledge B, en-
tails E, then the corresponding likelihood is one and it drops out of (8). If both 
likelihoods drop out we have the special case in which: 
P(Ai. Ti I E.B) P(Ai. Ti I B) 
P(A2.T2IE.B) 
(9) 
thereby placing the whole burden on the prior probabilities-the plausibility con-
siderations. Equation (9) represents a simplified Bayesian algorithm that is ap-
plicable in this type of special case. 
Another type of special case was mentioned above. If, as in our coin tossing 
example, the values of the prior probabilities do not differ drastically from one 
another, but the likelihoods become widely divergent as the observational evi-
dence accumulates, there will be a washing out of the priors. In this case, the ratio 
of the posterior probabilities equals, for practical purposes, the ratio of the 
likelihoods. 
The use of either (8) or (9) as an algorithm for theory choice does not imply 
that all scientists will agree on the numerical values or prefer the same theory. 
The evaluation of prior probabilities clearly demands the kind of scientific judg-
ment whose importance Kuhn has rightly insisted upon. It should also be clearly 
remembered that these formulas provide no evaluations of individual theories; 
they furnish only comparative evaluations. Thus, instead of yielding a prediction 
regarding the chances of one particular theory being a component of "completed 
science," they compare existing theories with regard to their present merits. 
§9. Kuhn's Criteria 
Early in this paper I quoted five criteria that Kuhn mentioned in connection 
with his views on the rationality and objectivity of science. The time has come 
to relate them explicitly to the Bayesian approach I have been attempting to 
elaborate. In order to appreciate the significance of these criteria it is important 
to distinguish three aspects of scientific theories that may be called informational 
virtues, confirmational virtues, and economic virtues. Up to this point we have 
concerned ourselves almost exclusively with confirmation, for our use ofBayes's 
theorem is germane only to the confirmational virtues. But since Kuhn's criteria 
patently refer to the other virtues as well, we must also say a little about them. 
Consider, for example, the matter of scope. Newton's three laws of motion and 
his law of universal gravitation obviously have greater scope than the conjunction 
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of Galileo's law of falling bodies and Kepler's three laws of planetary motion. 
This means, simply, that Newtonian mechanics contains more information than 
the laws of Kepler and Galileo taken together. Given a situation of this sort, we 
prefer the more informative theory because it is a basic goal of science to increase 
our knowledge as much as possible. We might, of course, hesitate to choose a 
highly informative theory if the evidence for it were extremely limited or shaky, 
because the desire to be right might overrule the desire to have more information 
content. But in the case at hand that consideration does not arise. 
In spite of its intuitive attraction, however, the appeal to scope is not altogether 
unproblematic. There are two ways in which we might construe the Galileo-
Kepler-Newton example of the preceding paragraph. First, we might ignore the 
small corrections mandated by Newton's theory in the laws of Galileo and Kepler. 
In that case we can clearly claim greater scope for Newton's laws than for the con-
junction of Galileo's and Kepler's laws, since the latter is entailed by the former 
but not conversely. Where an entailment relation holds we can make good sense 
of comparative scope. 
Kuhn, however, along with most of the historically oriented philosophers, has 
been at pains to deny that science progresses by finding more general theories that 
include earlier theories as special cases. Theory choice or preference involves 
competing theories that are mutually incompatible or mutually incommensurable. 
To the best of my knowledge Kuhn has not offered any precise characterization 
of scope; Karl Popper, in contrast, has made serious attempts to do so. In re-
sponse to Popper's efforts, Adolf Griinbaum has effectively argued that none of 
the Popperian measures can be usefully applied to make comparisons of scope 
among mutually incompatible competing theories. 38 Consequently, the concept 
of scope requires fundamental clarification if we are to use it to understand prefer-
ences among competing theories. However, since scope refers to information 
rather than confirmation, it plays no role in the Bayesian program I have been 
endeavoring to explicate. We can thus put aside the problem of explicating that 
difficult concept. 
Another of Kuhn's criteria is accuracy. It can, I think, be construed in two 
different ways. The first has to do with informational virtues; the second with eco-
nomic. On the one hand, two theories might both make true predictions regarding 
the same phenomena, but one of them might give us precise predictions where 
the other gives only predictions that are less exact. If, for example, one theory 
enables us to predict that there will be a solar eclipse on a given day, and that 
its path of totality will cross North America, it may well be furnishing correct 
information about the eclipse. If another theory gives not only the day, but also 
the time, and not only the continent, but also the precise boundaries, the second 
provides much more information, at least with respect to this particular occur-
rence. It is not that either is incorrect; rather, the second yields more knowledge 
than the first. However, it should be clearly noted- as it was in the case of 
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scope-that these theories are not incompatible or incommensurable competitors 
(at least with respect to this eclipse), and hence do not illustrate the interesting 
type of theory preference with which Kuhn is primarily concerned. 
On the other hand, one theory may yield predictions that are nearly, but not 
quite, correct, while another theory yields predictions that are entirely correct-
or, at least, more nearly correct. Newtonian astrophysics does well in ascertain-
ing the orbit of the earth, but general relativity introduces a correction of 3. 8 sec-
onds of arc per century in the precession of its perihelion. 39 Although the New-
tonian theory is literally false, it is used in contexts of this sort because its 
inaccuracy is small, and the economic gain involved in using it instead of general 
relativity (the saving in computational effort) is enormous. 
The remaining three criteria are simplicity, consistency, and fruitfulness; all 
of them have direct bearing upon the confirmational virtues. In the treatment of 
prior probabilities in §4, I briefly mentioned simplicity as a factor having a sig-
nificant bearing upon the plausibility of theories. More examples could be added, 
but I think the point is clear. 
In the same section I also made passing reference to consistency, but more can 
profitably be said on that topic. Consistency has two aspects, internal consistency 
of a theory and its compatibility with other accepted theories. While scientists 
may be fully justified in entertaining collections of statements that contain con-
tradictions, the goal of science is surely to accept only logically consistent the-
ories. 40 The discovery of an internal inconsistency has a distinctly adverse effect 
on the prior probability of that theory, to wit, it must go straight to zero. 
When we consider the relationships of a given theory to other accepted the-
ories we again find two aspects. There are deductive relations of entailment and 
incompatibility, and there inductive relations of fittingness and incongruity. The 
deductive relations are quite straightforward. Incompatibility with an accepted 
theory makes for implausibility; being a logical consequence of an accepted the-
ory makes for a high prior probability. Although deductive subsumption of nar-
rower theories under broader theories is probably something of an oversimpli-
fication of actual cases, nevertheless, the ability of an overarching theory to 
deductively unify diverse domains furnishes a strong plausibility argument. 
When it comes to the inductive relations among theories, analogy is, I think, 
the chief consideration. I have already mentioned the use of analogy in induc-
tively transferring results of experiments from rats to humans. In archaeology, 
the method of ethnographic analogy, which exploits similarities between extant 
primitive societies and prehistoric societies, is widely used. In physics, the anal-
ogy between the inverse square law of electrostatics and the inverse square law 
of gravitation provides an example of an important plausibility consideration. 
Kuhn's criteria of consistency (broadly construed) and simplicity seem clearly 
to pertain to assessments of the prior probabilities of theories. They cry out for 
a Bayesian interpretation. 
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The final criterion in Kuhn's list is fruitfulness; it has many aspects. Some the-
ories prove fruitful by unifying a great many apparently different phenomena in 
terms of a few simple principles. The Newtonian synthesis is, perhaps, the out-
standing example; Maxwellian electrodynamics is also an excellent case. As I 
suggested above, this ability to accommodate a wide variety of facts tends to en-
hance the prior probability of a given theory. To attribute diverse success to hap-
penstance, rather than basic correctness, is implausible. 
Another sort of fertility involves the predictability of theretofore unknown 
phenomena. We might mention as familiar illustrations the prediction of the Pois-
son bright spot by the wave theory of light and the prediction of time dilation by 
special relativity. These are the kinds of instances in which, in an important 
sense, the expectedness is low. As we have noted, a small expectedness tends to 
increase the posterior probability of a hypotheses. 
A further type of fertility relates directly to plausible scenarios; a theory is 
fruitful in this way if it successfully copes with difficulties with the aid of suitable 
auxiliary assumptions. Newtonian mechanics again provides an excellent ex-
ample. The perturbations of Uranus were explained by postulating Neptune. The 
perturbations of Neptune were explained by postulating Pluto. 41 The motions of 
stars within galaxies and of galaxies within clusters are explained in terms of dark 
matter, concerning which there are many current theories. A theory that readily 
gives rise to plausible scenarios to deal with problematic likelihoods can boast this 
sort of fertility. 
The discussion of Kuhn's criteria in this section is intended to show how ade-
quately they can be understood within a Bayesian framework - insofar as they are 
germane to confirmation. If it is sound, we have constructed a fairly substantial 
bridge connecting Kuhn's views on theory choice with those of the logical 
empiricists-at least, those who find in Bayes's theorem a suitable schema for 
characterizing the confirmation of hypotheses and theories. 
§10. Rationality vs. Objectivity 
In the title of this essay I have used both the concept of rationality and that 
of objectivity. It is time to say something about their relationship. Perhaps the best 
way to approach the distinction between them is to enumerate various grades of 
rationality. In a certain sense one can be rational without paying any heed at all 
to objectivity. It is essentially a matter of good housekeeping as far as one's beliefs 
and degrees of confidence are concerned. As Bayesians have often emphasized, 
it is important to avoid logical contradictions in one's beliefs and to avoid 
probabilistic incoherence in one's degrees of conviction. If contradiction or inco-
herence are discovered, they must somehow be eliminated; the presence of either 
constitutes a form of irrationality. But the removal of such elements of irrational-
ity can be accomplished without any appeal to facts outside of the subject's corpus 
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of beliefs and degrees of confidence. To achieve this sort of rationality is to 
achieve a minimal standard that I have elsewhere called static rationality. 42 
One way in which additional facts may enter the picture is via Bayes's theorem. 
We have a theory Tin which we have a particular degree of confidence. A new 
piece of evidence turns up-some objective fact E of which we were previously 
unaware-and we use Bayes's theorem to calculate a posterior probability of T. 
To accept this value of the posterior probability as one's degree of confidence in 
T is known as Bayesian conditionalization. Use of Bayes's theorem does not, 
however, guarantee objectivity. If the resulting posterior probability of T is one 
we are not willing to accept, we can make adjustments elsewhere to avoid inco-
herence. After all, the prior probabilities and likelihoods are simply personal 
probabilities, so they can be adjusted to achieve the desired result. If, however, 
the requirement of Bayesian conditionalization is added to those of static rational-
ity we have a stronger type of rationality that I have called kinematic. 43 
The highest grade of rationality- what I have called dynamic rationality -
requires much fuller reference to objective fact than is demanded by advocates 
of personalism. The most obvious way to inject a substantial degree of objectivity 
into our deliberations regarding choices of scientific theories is to provide an ob-
jective interpretation of the probabilities in Bayes's theorem. Throughout this dis-
cussion I have adopted that approach as thoroughly as possible. For instance, I 
have argued that prior probabilities can be given an objective interpretation in 
terms of frequencies of success. I have tried to show how likelihoods could be 
objective-by virtue of entailment relations, tests of statistical significance, or ob-
served frequencies. When the likelihoods created major difficulties, I appealed 
to plausible scenarios. The result was that an intractable likelihood could be ex-
changed for a tractable prior probability- namely, the prior probability of a the-
ory in conjunction with an auxiliary assumption. 
We noted that the denominators of the right-hand sides of the various versions 
ofBayes's theorem-equations (1), (3), and (4)-contain either an expectedness 
or a likelihood on the catchall. It seems to me futile to try to construe either of 
these probabilities objectively. Consequently, in §7 I introduced equation (6), 
which involves a ratio of two instances of Bayes's theorem, and from which the 
expectedness and the likelihood on the catchall drop out. Confining our attention, 
as Kuhn recommends, to comparing the merits of competing theories, rather than 
offering absolute evaluations of individual theories, we were able to eliminate the 
probabilities that most seriously defy objective interpretation. 
§ 11. Conclusions 
For many years I have been convinced that plausibility arguments in science 
have constituted a major stumbling block to an understanding of the logic of 
scientific inference. Kuhn was not alone, I believe, in recognizing that considera-
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tions of plausibility constitute an essential aspect of scientific reasoning, without 
seeing where they fit into the logic of science. If one sees confirmation solely in 
terms of the crude hypothetico-deductive method, there is no place for them. 
There is, consequently, an obvious incentive for relegating plausibility considera-
tions to heuristics. If one accepts the traditional distinction between the context 
of discovery and the context of justification, it is tempting to place them in the 
former context. But Kuhn recognized, I think, that plausibility arguments enter 
into the justifications of choices of theories, with the result that he became skepti-
cal of the value of that distinction. If, as I believe, plausibility considerations are 
simply evaluations of prior probabilities of hypotheses or theories, then it be-
comes apparent via Bayes's theorem that they play an indispensable role in the 
context of justification. We do not need to give up that important distinction. 
At several places in this paper I have spoken of Bayesian algorithms, mainly 
because Kuhn introduced that notion into the discussion. I have claimed that such 
algorithms exist-and attempted to exhibit them-but I accord very little sig-
nificance to that claim. The algorithms are trivial; what is important is the scien-
tific judgment involved in assessing the probabilities that are fed into the equa-
tions. The algorithms give frameworks in terms of which to understand the role 
of the sort of judgment upon which Kuhn rightly placed great emphasis. 
The history of science chronicles the successes and failures of attempts at 
scientific theorizing. If the Bayesian analysis I have been offering is at all sound, 
history of science-in addition to contemporary scientific experience, of 
course-provides a rich source of information relevant to the prior probabilities 
of the theories among which we are at present concerned to make objective and 
rational choices. This viewpoint captures, I believe, the point Kuhn made at the 
beginning of his first book: 
But an age as dominated by science as our own does need a perspective from 
which to examine the scientific beliefs which it takes so much for granted, and 
history provides one important source of such perspective. If we can discover 
the origins of some modem scientific concepts and the way in which they sup-
planted the concepts of an earlier age, we are more likely to evaluate intelli-
gently their chances for survival. 44 
I suggested at the outset that an appeal to Bayesian principles could provide 
some aid in bridging the gap between Hempel's logical-empiricist approach and 
Kuhn's historical approach. I hope I have offered a convincing case. However that 
may be, there remain many unresolved issues. For instance, I have not even 
broached the problem of incommensurability of paradigms or theories. This is 
a major issue. For another example, I have assumed uncritically throughout the 
discussion that the various parties to disputes about theories share a common body 
B of background knowledge. It is by no means obvious that this is a tenable as-
sumption. No doubt other points for controversy remain. I do not for a moment 
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maintain that complete consensus would be in the offing even if both camps were 
to buy the Bayesian line I have been peddling. But I do hope that some areas of 
misunderstanding have been clarified. 
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